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NO-FAULT INSURANCE AND THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS-AN INTERIM UPDATE
P. JOHN KozYMs*
In an article published in the Duke Law Journal in fune of 1972, Professor
Kozyris proposed a choice of law system for no-fault which would resolve in a
novel way the confusion engendered by disparate state approaches to the problems
of compensation and liability for injuries resulting from automobile accidents, by
tying the extent and nature of both the victim's recovery and the driver's liability
to the respective laws of their states of domicil-regardless of the place of the ac-
cident. During the period subsequent to the publication of that article, the pro-
posed "federal standard" no-fault bill has been modified to reflect substantial defer-
ence to the domiciliary concept in its choice of law provisions, while the various
state plans adopted have continued to reflect a notable preference for a territorialist
approach. In this article, Professor Kozyris favorably analyzes the choice of law
provisions of the proposed federal bill. In a less encouraging vein, his demonstra-
tion of the anomalous results generated by the territorialism of some of the recently
enacted state plans suggests that a rational and consistent choice of law scheme for
the interstate automobile accident may be a long way off if the federal bill is not
enacted.
When I attempted to untangle the interstate aspects of the no-
fault automobile insurance plans more than a year ago, recommend-
ing a drastic domicil-oriented solution,' I was rushing to print with
* J.D. 1960, Cornell University; Professor of Law, College of Law, Ohio State
University.
1. Kozyris, No-Fault Automobile Insurance and the Conflict of Laws-Cutting
the Gordian Knot Home-Style, 1972 DulE L.J. 331. The solution proposed in this
article was most basically stated in the form of a "golden rule": "to each according to
his need, as determined by his state, and from each according to his obligation, as
defined by his own state." Id. at 390. Translated into practical effect, an enacting
no-fault state would extend its first-party benefits, limited strict liability, and tort ex-
emption only to its own domiciliaries, regardless of the place of the accident. Id.
at 394. In the case of an accident involving domiciliaries of the enacting state and
domiciliaries of another state, the claims of the latter parties would be relegated to
their own laws, whether no-fault or liability, and would be met by the residual coverage
of the enacting state's insurance policies; and their liabilities would also be determined
under their own state's laws. The disparities between recovery and liability, if any,
would be taken care of through the insurance mechanism. Id. at 397-98.
HEREINAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS
ARTICLE:
MIcHiGAN Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3101-179 (1973-74 Supp.) (effective Oct. 1,
1973) (CCH AUTo. L. RHI.-INs. 1963 (Nov. 16, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Mich.
No-Fault];
New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6A-1 to
6A-20 (Supp. 1973-74) (effective Jan. 1, 1973) (CCH AUTO. L. REP.-INs. 1 1971
(Jan. 11, 1973)) [hereinafter cited as N.J. No-Fault];
New York Comprehensive Insurance Act, Insurance Law art. 18, ch. 13, Laws
1973 (effective Feb. 1, 1974) (CCH AUTO. L. REP.-INs. 1 1973 (Feb. 22, 1973))
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the scholar's fear, and reformer's hope, that a federal uniform plan
might very well be adopted within the year which would melt the
problem away and make my contribution academic. Instead, the
original federal plan lost momentum2 and its proponents reduced
their sights to minimum federal no-fault standards.3 In the mean-
time state plans of diverse natures proliferated. 4  "True" no-fault
plans, mandating substantial insurance benefits and abolishing tort
[hereinafter cited as N.Y. No-Fault];
Kozyris, No-Fault Automobile Insurance and the Conflict of Laws-Cutting the
Gordian Knot Home-Style, 1972 DUKE L.J 331 [hereinafter cited as Kozyris].
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, UNIFORM MOTOR
VEHICLE AccIDENT REPARATIONS Acr, Official Draft with Prefatory Notes and Com-
ments (edition of Nov. 1, 1972) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM ACr];
S. 354, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (revised bill, reprinted in 119 CONe. Rue.
S. 15569 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1973)) [hereinafter cited as Magnuson-Hart].
2. The Hart Bill, S. 945, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (revised bill, reprinted in
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 305-32
(1971)) proposed a comprehensive federal no-fault plan which would have generally
abolished tort liability of owners and drivers for personal injuries caused by the negli-
gent operation of insured automobiles throughout the United States; and would have
required all automobile owners to carry insurance covering the net economic loss of all
injured persons, with the exception of occupants of other automobiles and persons en-
gaged in criminal conduct. A substantially modified version of the Hart Bill, S. 945,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (The National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act), was
referred on Aug. 8, 1972, by a 49-46 vote of the Senate, to a "dead-end" study in the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 118 CoNG. REC., S. 13069-93 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1972).
See Magnuson, Nationwide No-Fault, 44 Miss. L.J. 132 (1973). See note 3 infra.
3. By the time S. 945, supra note 2, was reported out of committee, its sponsors
had abandoned their ambitious plans for a comprehensive national no-fault plan and
had retreated to the more modest "minimum standards" approach-through which
Congress merely establishes minimum nationwide standards, which the states must ei-
ther equal or exceed in designing what is still their own no fault compensation scheme.
Only in non-complying states does a federal Alternative Plan actually go into effect.
See Magnuson, supra note 2, at 148.
On January 12, 1973, Senator Magnuson introduced in the Senate, for action by
the 93d Congress, S. 354, which resembled S. 945 in all respects except that it now
adopted the basic provisions and terminology of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident
Reparations Act for the minimum standards and for the federal Alternative Plan
which will go into effect in the non-complying states. 119 CoNG. RFc. S. 518-35
(daily ed. Jan. 12, 1973). For further discussion of the Uniform Act, see note 23
infra and accompanying text. Lengthy hearings were held on S. 354 before the Senate
Commerce Committee in the Spring of 1973. A similar piece of legislation was intro-
duced in the House on February 7, 1973 by Representative Matsunaga, H. 4023, and
was referred to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. 119
CoNG. Ruc. H. 872 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1973).
On August 3, 1973, a revised version of S. 354 was reported to the Senate by
Senators Magnuson, Hart and others. i19 CoNG. REc. S. 15569 (daily ed. Aug. 3,
1973).
4. For a full collection of the texts of these plans, see CCH AuTo. L. Rm'.-INs.
f 1935-87B (1973).
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liability to some extent, were enacted (in addition to those previously
in effect in Massachusetts and Florida5 ) in Colorado,6 Connecticut, 7
Hawaii,8 Kansas,' Michigan,'0 Nevada," New Jersey,' 2 New York,'8
and Utah.14  No-fault features were also incorporated in the legis-
lation of Arkansas, 15 Maryland,'8 Minnesota, 17 Texas,'8 and Virginia, 9
who thus joined Delaware, Illinois, Oregon, and South Dakota" in the
"hybrid" no-fault category. It has been reported that 42 percent of the
population of the United States is presently under some kind of a no-
fault system and that pending legislation in ten more states, with a
5. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 90, § 34A, D, M, N (Supp. 1972); as amended by id.
§ 340; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(1) (1972). See Kozyris at 380-83. The Florida
Supreme Court, however, recently held that the Florida statute's abolition of vehicular
property damage recovery in tort was unconstitutional under the Florida constitution.
Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). The ruling did not consider the constitu-
tionality of the other provisions of the Florida statute.
6. Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-25-1
to 13-25-22 (Supp. 1973) (effective April 1, 1974) (CCH Auro. L. REv.-Is. 11 1946
(June 1, 1973) ). It is to be noted that the people of Colorado had previously re-
jected a no-fault plan by a decisive margin in a referendum held in November of 1972.
See Omo TRrAL 1 (Feb. 1973).
7. No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Law, Conn. Laws 1972, P.A. No. 273
(May 19, 1972) (CCH AUTO. L. REP.-INS. 1947 (July 14, 1972)) (effective Jan. 1,
1973).
8. Hawaii Motor Vehicle Reparations Act, H.B. No. 637, Laws 1973 (approved
and effective May 31, 1973, for full implementation on July 1, 1974) (CCH AuTo. L.
REP.-IN s. 1952 (June 14, 1973)).
9. Kansas Automobile Reparations Act, Laws 1973, H.B. No. 1129 (Apr. 11,
1973) (CCH Atro. L. REP.-INS. 111957 (Apr. 19, 1972)) (effective Jan. 1, 1974).
10. Mich. No-Fault.
11. Nevada Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, as amended by Laws 1973, ch. 530,
§§ 2-51 (Apr. 24, 1973) (CCH AuTo. L. REP.-INs. 1969 (June 1, 1973)) (effective
Feb. 1, 1974).
12. NJ. No-Fault.
13. N.Y. No-Fault. For a detailed discussion of the New York plan, see Com-
ment, New York Adopts No-Fault: A Summary and Analysis, 37 ALB. L. REv. 662
(1973).
14. Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, Laws 1973, S.D. No. 112 (CCH
Airro. L. REP.-INs. 11985 (Apr. 5, 1973) (effective Jan. 1, 1974).
15. Ark. Acts 1973, H.B. 158 (Feb. 16, 1973). (CCH AUTo. L. REP.-INS. 1 1944
(June 1, 1973)) (effective July 1, 1974).
16. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 538-546 (1972 Supp.) (effective Jan. 1, 1973)
(CCH AUTO. L. REP.-INs. 11961 (Jun. 29, 1972)).
17. MNN. STAT. ANN. §§65B.01-.27 (1973 Supp.).
18. Tex. Ins. Code art. 5.06-3, added by. Laws 1973, H.B. No. 143 (Apr. 24,
1973) (CCH Atrro. L REP.-INs. 11 1984 (May 3, 1973)).
19. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.1-380.1 and 46.1-4971 (1973 Supp.) (effective July 1,
1973) (CCH AuTo. L. REP.-INs. 1987 (May 3, 1973)).
20. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118 (Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, §
1065.150-.163 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); OREGON LAWS 1971, H.B. No. 1300; S.D.
CoMP. LAws ANN. § 58-23-6 to -23-8 (Supp. 1973).
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good chance of passage, would bring the figure up to 76 percent.2 1 In
other words, no-fault is spreading like wildfire.22
At its annual conference of August, 1972, the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a final
draft of a Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act2" and
recommended it for enactment in all states. The National Commis-
sioners stuck by their original plan,24 thus presenting a Uniform Act
which combines abolition of tort liability for economic loss and most
forms of general damages with comprehensive insurance coverage
exceeding that in force in any of the presently enacted no-fault
plans.2 5 State legislation based on the Uniform Act is reported to
be under consideration in Arizona, Kansas, and Minnesota. 26  On the
negative side, the American Bar Association, for the first time in
history, squarely disapproved the Uniform Act and voted to "take
immediate and greatly increased steps" to oppose state or federal no-
fault plans which include a tort exemption. 7  In addition, the insur-
ance industry, a substantial segment of which had been supporting
strong no-fault,28 reached a compromise which is "far more con-
servative in all respects" than the Uniform Act.29
What is the portent of all this for the interstate problem? One
thing is certain now: even under the new Magnuson-Hart "national
standards" bill, 0 the possibility of conflicts will persist, since each
21. Auto Reform in No-Fault Moves Ahead-76% of U.S. Population Covered,
T1tu, vol. 9, no. 4 at 5 (Jul.-Aug. 1973).
22. For a recent symposium on no-fault, see Symposium, No Fault Automobile
Insurance, 44 Miss. L.J 1-181 (1973).
23. Uriwoiu Acr. For a discussion of the Uniform Act, see, e.g., Hill, The Uni.
form Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act, THE FORUM, Vol. 8, 1972, at 1; Ghliardi
& Kircher, The Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act: An Analysis and
Critique, 40 INs. COMM. J. 87-110 (1973); Henderson, The Uniform Motor Vehicle
Accident Reparations Act, 44 Miss. LJ. 107 (1973).
24. For a description of the original plan, see Kozyris at 377-80.
25. Only the Michigan plan is viewed as approximating the Uniform Act in scope
of coverage. See 119 CONG. REc. S. 9507, 9508 (daily ed. May 22, 1973) (remarks
of Senator Stevens).
26. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Law Memo 2 (Spring 1973).
27. Id. at 1, 3. See also Meserve, President Meserve States American Bar Asso-
ciation Opposition to National No-Fault Insurance Act, 59 A.R.A.J. 607 (1973).
28. See Kozyris 334 & n.8.
29. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Law
Memo 2 (Spring 1973). It has been reported, however, that State Farm Mutual, the
nation's largest auto insurer, announced its support of the Magnuson-Hart minimum
standards. N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1973, § 1, at 15, col. 1.
30. See note 3 supra.
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state is given wide latitude in drafting its own plan, provided that, in
its entirety, such plan meets or exceeds the minimum standards.31
What if Magnuson-Hart fails? Then the state patchwork is likely
to continue with no assurance of nationwide acceptance of genuine
no-fault, let alone minimum uniformity. In this eventuality, and
given the fact that accidents involving out-of-state persons or cars
are quite common,32 the conflicts complications will be at their zen-
ith.
MAGNUSON-HART AND CONFLICTS: A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
While the state plans are infused with strong dosages of terd-
torialism, a major breakthrough towards a more sensible choice-of-
law approach has occurred at the national level. The latest version
of Magnuson-Hart, which initially had incorporated the largely terri-
torialist Uniform Act as a model for the states,33 has shifted de-
cisively in the direction of the domiciliary contact,34 much along the
lines proposed in my original article, at least within the no-
fault system.
Magnuson-Hart establishes minimum national standards which
must be met by the states in order to avoid the imposition of a federal
Alternative Plan.35 In the choice-of-law area, the principal features
of the "minimum standards" state plans and of the federal alternative
plan are the same.
First, car owners throughout the United States must provide
31. Magnuson-Hart, § 202(b). See note 3 supra.
32. See Kozyris 341 n.28. See also U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, I AUTOMO-
BILE PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS 10-11 (1970).
33. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
34. Magnuson-Hart, especially § 110(c), which provides:
(c) APPLICABLE LAW.-(1) The basic restoration benefits availa-
ble to any victim or to any survivor of a deceased victim shall be determined
pursuant to the provisions of the State no-fault plan for motor vehicle insur-
ance in accordance with title II or title I of this Act which is in effect in the
State of domicile of the victim on the date when the motor vehicle accident
resulting in injury occurs. If there is no such State no-fault plan in effect or
if the victim is not domiciled in any State, then basic restoration benefits
available to any victim shall be determined pursuant to the provisions of the
State no-fault plan for motor vehicle insurance, if any, in effect in the State
in which the accident resulting in injury occurs.
(2) The right of a victim or of a survivor of a deceased victim to sue
in tort shall be determined by the law of the State of domicile of such victim.
If a victim is not domiciled in a State, such right to sue shall be determined by
the law of the State in which the accident resulting in injury or damage to
property occurs.
It is the author's understanding that no changes to section 110 are presently contem-
plated by the Senate Commerce Committee, which has been leading the fight for na-
tional no-fault.
35. Id. § 201. See note 3 supra.
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security under the plan in effect at the state of registration or opera-
tion of the car.36 This usually happens to be the state of their domi-
cil or residence.31
Second, the qualifying insurance must (or is "construed" to) con-
tain no-fault "coverage sufficient to satisfy the requirements for secu-
rity covering a motor vehicle in any State in which any victim who is
a claimant or whose survivors are claimants is domiciled or is in-
jured."38  This sweeping provision is essential for the protection of
insureds who become involved in accidents in circumstances where
no-fault benefits exceeding those required by the state of the insured
are recoverable. "Victim" is defined to include all persons suffering
"injury arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle." 9
Third, the insurance policies must also contain $50,000 cover-
age "to protect the owner or operator of a motor vehicle from tort
liability to which he is exposed" in the "state of domicile of a
victim" (or in the state of injury, if not domiciled in any state) but
to which "he would not have been exposed in the State of registra-
tion of the motor vehicle." 40
Fourth, the no-fault benefits to all victims or survivors are deter-
mined under the plan in effect at the state of their domicil. If they
are not domiciled in any state, then they recover under the law of
the state of the accident. 41
Fifth, the extent of the tort exemption available to the actor is
to .be "determined by the law of the State of domicile of [the]
victim," or, if not domiciled in any state, by the law of the state of
the accident.42
36. Id. §§ 104, 202(a), 301.
37. Magnuson-Hart does not define "domicil." For a discussion of the ambiguities
caused by the interchangeable usage of the terms "domicil" and "residence," see
Kozyris 354 n.89, 392-93. It would be wise, if not indispensable, for the bill to in-
corporate a clear, workable definition of "domicil" with particularized provisions, for
example, for corporations, rental cars, students, etc. As for terminology, I would
prefer "habitual residence" or "settled residence" over "domocil" as more indicative of
the home connection. Id. In the present article, I use "domicil" and "home state"
interchangeably to refer to the same kind of main link.
38. Maguson-Hart §§ 110(b)(1), 202(a), 301.
39. Id. § 103(33).
40. Id. §§ 110(b)(2), 202(a), 301.
41. Id. §§ 110(c)(1), 202(a), 301.
42. Id. §§ 110(c)(2), 202(a), 301. The language in section 110(c)(2) to the
effect that "the right of a victim or of a survivor of a deceased victim to sue in tort
shall be determined by the law of the State of domicile of such victim" could be
broadly interpreted to establish a federal choice-of-law rule for tort claims for the negli-
gent operation of automobiles in general. See also section 110(b)(2) which requires
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Sixth, all victims, whether owners, operators, passengers or pe-
destrians, are entitled to no-fault benefits for accidents within the
United States .4  For accidents in Puerto Rico, Canada, and Mexico,
no-fault benefits are payable only to the insured, that is, the named
insured and his resident family, and to the occupants of the insured
car.
44
Seventh, the victim recovers first from his own insurer, where-
ever and in whatever connection injured, and whether or not injured
in or by his car.45 Considering that the owner and his resident
family are covered under the owner's policy; that all car owners must
carry such a policy; and that there are few people in the United
States who neither own cars nor are resident members of a car-owning
family, the federal plan goes a long way towards transforming auto-
mobile accident insurance from a third-party to a first-party com-
pensation system. This will make it easier for insurance companies
to measure their exposure and to calculate their premiums accord-
ingly.46 With respect to the uninsured, they recover from the in-
the insurance policy to provide coverage protecting the owner from "tort liability to
which he is exposed through application of the law of the State of domicile of a vic-
tim - .. but to which he would not have been exposed through application of the law
of the State of registration of the motor vehicle." It would appear, however, that such
a far-reaching preemption of state tort choice-of-law practice was not intended, and this
language should be understood to refer only to the application of the tort exemption
within the context of the federal no-fault plan.
43. Id. § 203(a), which provides:
(a) ACCIDENT WITHIN A STATE.-If the accident resulting in
injury occurs in a State in which a no-fault plan for motor vehicle insurance
in accordance with this title or title M of this Act is in effect, any victim or
any survivor of a deceased victim is entitled to receive basic restoration bene-
fits.
44. Id. § 203(b), which provides:
(b) ACCIDENT OUTSIDE ANY STATE.-If the accident resulting
in injury occurs outside a State in which a no-fault plan is in effect, but in
any other State, Puerto Rico, Canada, or Mexico, a victim or a survivor of a
deceased victim is entitled to receive basic restoration benefits if such victim is
or was-
(1) an insured; or(2) the driver or other occupant of a secured vehicle.
The reasons for maintenance of a territorial, Keeton-O'Connell type approach for
accidents outside the United States are not clear. It may be that section 203 has not as
yet been redesigned to conform to the basic change of conflicts philosophy incorporated
in section 110. See note 34 supra. Or, more probably, the retention of this approach
may reflect a decision to use the pure domiciliary conflicts approach only within the
no-fault system. In principle, this aberration of section 203(b) (2) for international
conflicts is unfortunate, but it should be noted that it will be of only minor signifi-
cance in practice.
45. Id. §§ 202(a), 205(a) (2), 301.
46. See the ingenious optional provision in Section 204(b) (1) (B) of the bill,
to the effect that a named insured who, prior to the accident, voluntarily discloses to
his insurer his actual monthly earned income and agrees that such sum shall measure
work loss, is limited accordingly.
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surer or insurers of the cars involved 47 or, as a last resort, from the
assigned claims plan of their domicil, or, if not domiciled in any state,
from the plan of the accident state.48
The proposed federal bill adopts a choice of law approach which
is clearly consistent with the compensatory aims of no-fault and with
the grand design of spreading the losses through mandatory insur-
ance. Its main thrust conforms to the "golden rule" enunciated in
my original article 4 9-it imposes insurance obligations on each car
owner essentially under the law of his state and determines the repar-
ation rights of each victim under the law of the victim's own home
state. The use of the law of the place of the accident (lex loci
delicti) as an auxiliary connecting factor for no-fault when a
victim is not domiciled within a state in the United States, which
in operation would be limited essentially to non-resident aliens, is
quite appropriate, assuming a goal of expansive coverage for the no-
fault system and recognition of the accident state's secondary in-
terest in the availability of sufficient reparations to the victims of
traffic accidents.
In sum, with minor reservations as to particular details and lan-
guage used in the federal plan, this writer wholeheartedly approves of
its basic approach. The decision to make the choice of law turn on
such specific connecting factors as, primarily, domicil, and second-
arily, locus of the accident, is probably the only workable solution
to a problem of such vast complexity as the interstate auto accident
in the no-fault setting. Given the multiplicity of "significant" con-
tacts likely to be invoked in such accidents, not to mention the
variety of parties on behalf of whom a "government interest" might
be advanced, reliance on the modem conflicts methodologies ° to
produce a suitable resolution in each case, or type of case, could
lead only to further confusion. In light of such prospects, and in
view of the visibility of the basic policies involved,' 1 resort to the
more manageable rules adopted in Magnuson-Hart seems preferable
to a quest for the "perfect," but elusive, ad hoc justice of the purists.
47. Magnuson-Hart §§ 202(a), 205(a)(3)-(4), 301.
48. Id. §§ 108(a)(1), 202(a), 205(a)(5), 301.
49. See note 1 supra.
50. The "governmental interests analysis" of Brainerd Currie, the "principles of
preference" of David Cavers, and the "most significant relationship" test of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS (1971) are perhaps the most influen-
tial of the modern conflicts methodologies and are discussed in Kozyris 348-52.
51. Le., compensating injured persons as efficiently and equitably as possible,




ThE UNnFoRM ACT AND THE STATE PLANS
Given the relatively progressive nature of the federal bill, it is
disappointing that the final version of the Uniform Act did not
significantly depart from the essentially territorialist choice of law
approach of the earlier draft.2 Thus, while the present Uniform
Act does provide coverage for the insured, his resident relatives, and
occupants of the insured car even when they are involved in out-of-state
accidents,5 3 the Act's partial tort exemption still stops at the state
line.5 4 All persons injured in-state are entitled to no-fault benefits
and all persons injured out-of-state, other than those mentioned above,
are excluded. Only the uninsured owner is excluded from the tort
exemption for in-state accidents. 55 The domicil or residence of the
victim as such is essentially of no consequence.
It is the author's understanding that certain draftsmen of the
choice of law provisions of the Uniform Act, who were not con-
vinced of the soundness of the domiciliary approach in the context
of the Act, were nonetheless influential in moving the federal plan
in the domiciliary direction. This inconsistency apparently does not
reflect a change of heart, but rather a reconsideration of the suit-
ability of the territorial approach in a setting where minimum no-
fault standards are imposed nationwide. When tort liability dis-
appears (at least up to a given damage threshold) and when dif-
ferences as to recoverable benefits among the state plans are reduced,
the conflicts become less acute, and the balance of argument shifts
in favor of the personal over the territorial contact.
If the federal plan is not eventually enacted, and in view of the
very limited success of the Uniform Act, the odds are in favor of a
continuation of the state-by-state, crazy-quilt pattern of conflicting
accident reparation provisions.
A review of the present state plans in the context of their inter-
state application reinforces the prediction in my original article that
territorialism would continue to play a major role, particularly for the
tort exemption. At the same time, the categories of persons entitled
to first-party type insurance benefits have generally been broadly de-
fined, which has the practical effect of bringing the bulk of such
persons within the plan of their domicil or residence.
52. See Kozyris 377-80.
53. UNwoam Acr §§ l(a)(3), 2(b).
54. Id. § 5.
55. Id. §§ 2(a), 5.
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Rather than summarize and compare the interstate features of
the new state no-fault plans in abstracto or in tabular form, it would
be more interesting and instructive to explain how they work in parti-
cular situations. Since both Michigan and New York have joined the
no-fault movement, it would be intriguing to start with a hypotheti-
cal along the basic pattern of the famous case of Tooker v. Lopez,?'
advancing the date ten years to 1974.
THE Tooker v. Lopez HYPOTHETICAL
The Tooker scenario is rather simple: Miss Tooker and Miss
Lopez, Michigan coeds but New York domiciliaries, were killed in
a one-car accident in Michigan, Miss Lopez at the wheel. Another
passenger, Miss Silk, a Michigan girl, was injured. The car belonged
to Miss Lopez' father, a New York domiciliary, and had been reg-
istered and insured in New York. Miss Tooker's father sued in
New York for wrongful death, and the Court of Appeals ultimately
applied New York law in rejecting the Lopez defense based on the
Michigan guest statute. In rejecting the lex loci in favor of the dom-
iciliary law, the court concluded that there was no Michigan policy
or interest which would be vindicated by the application of the
Michigan guest statute to ban the Tooker claim. In the absence
of a competing state interest, the court felt free to apply New York law
to determine the rights and responsibilities of its domiciliaries."
With the poetic license freely available to conflicts writers, and
for the specific purpose of complicating matters in order to test the
outer limits of the plans, let these facts be changed in the following
ways. First, all three girls survived but were only slightly injured.
Second, the crash involved a collision with an uninsured car registered
in Ohio, driven by an Ohio domiciliary who was also slightly in-
jured. Ohio has no mandatory insurance requirement. Third, the
accident also injured an innocent pedestrian from New Jersey (which
recently enacted a no-fault plan)58 who was visiting Ann Arbok as
a tourist and who had car owner's insurance in New Jersey. Fourth,
only Miss Lopez was negligent. Fifth, the Lopez car was directly
owned and registered by Miss Lopez rather than her father. And
sixth, Miss Lopez and Miss Tooker were only passing through Mich-
igan to pick up their Michigan friend, Miss Silk, during a planned
vacation trip to California.
56. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
57. Id. at 576, 249 N.E.2d at 398, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
58. See note 12 supra.
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To put the question in the classical law-school-exam fashion:
What are the rights of the parties? Or better: What is the effect of
the various state no-fault plans involved upon the rights of the
parties?
Tort and Other Liability. It is clear that the tort liability of
the hypothetical Miss Tooker toward all the potential claimants re-
mains unaffected by the Michigan, New Jersey, and New York plans.
In Michigan, the tort exemption applies to in-state accidents but only
if the car is insured under the Michigan plan.59 The New Jersey
and New York tort exemptions apply only to in-state accidents.60
Thus, in a situation where a driver from a no-fault state has an
accident in another no-fault state, injuring a party from yet another
no-fault state, we are left with the questionable result of no appli-
cable tort exemption.
It is interesting to observe that had the Ohioan had an injured
passenger and had his car been in Michigan for more than thirty days
in the same calendar year, he would have been personally liable under
the Michigan plan to pay Michigan-type no-fault benefits to his pas-
senger on a strict liability basis.61 The same would have been true
for Miss Lopez with respect to Miss Tooker and Miss Silk had Miss
Lopez satisfied the thirty-day test, regardless of negligence. In that
situation, would her New York insurance policy have covered her?
New York has carried its territorialism to the point of requiring
New York policies to carry residual insurance coverage to comply
with the mandatory insurance provisions of the state where the car
is driven.2 This attempt to fix the insured's out-of-state obligations
in accordance with the law of the place of the accident could pro-
59. See Mich. No-Fault §§ 3135(2), 3101(3)-(4). It should be pointed out, how-
ever, that if the New York insurer of Miss Lopez happened to have been authorized
to transact business in Michigan and had filed a required special certificate in Michi-
gan, the New York policy would have included Michigan coverage, id. § 3163, in
which case the partial Michigan tort exemption would have been applicable.
60. N.J. No-Fault § 8; N.Y. No-Fault § 673(1).
61. Mich. No-Fault §§ 3102, 3177.
62. N.Y. No-Fault § 672(5). Michigan also follows this approach. See Mich.
No-Fault § 3131.
In Comment, supra note 13, at 679 (1973), the New York provision is explained
as follows: "When a vehicle insured in New York is driven in another state or
Canadian province, the rights of New York motorists are generally determined under
the laws of the particular place in which the motorist is driving." See also Urnwonm
Acr § 5, Comments, at p.26:
This Section limits the application of the general tort exemption to lia-
bility arising from motor vehicle accidents within the state. The victim of
an out-of-state automobile accident would be entitled to whatever tort remedy
is allowed him by the state where the accident occurred. ...
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duce paradoxical results in situations where a court applies one of
the modem conflicts methodologies, such as government interest an-
alysis, to impose liability under the laws of a state in which the in-
sured was not driving at the time of the accident. Such an even-
tuality could conceivably leave the New York insured without cov-
erage, since his policy technically need only comply with the man-
datory provisions of states where the car is driven at the time of the
accident. If Miss Lopez had been in-state for thirty days, however,
the Michigan plan would have required the exaction of no-fault
reparations in accordance with the Michigan requirements. And
since Miss Lopez was driving in Michigan when the accident occurred,
the payments would probably come within the New York in-
surance coverage under the residual liability clause.0 3
Returning to the basic hypothetical of Miss Lopez' negligence,
the outcome with respect to the tort claim of Miss Tooker (a guest of
Miss Lopez domiciled in New York) would depend on whether the ac-
tion is brought in Michigan or in New York. Since Michigan follows
basically the lex loci delicti rule, 64 the Tooker claim would be barred
under the Michigan guest statute65 in Michigan; whereas it would be
allowed in New York under New York law, which has no guest statute
and which would be applicable pursuant to the actual Tooker decision.6 0
As to the claim of Miss Silk (a guest of Miss Lopez domiciled in Michi-
gan) it would be barred under Michigan law even if the action were
brought in New York, in accordance with the deviation from Tooker
elaborated in Neumeier v. Kuehner.67 In that case, the New York Court
of Appeals held that it would enforce a foreign guest statute to bar re-
covery in behalf of a domiciliary of the foreign jurisdiction killed in an
automobile accident in that jurisdiction while the guest of a New York
domiciliary. The court distinguished Tooker by reasoning that New York
had no interest in protecting a foreign domiciliary from limitations on
his right to recovery imposed by his own jurisdiction.6 8
No-Fault Benefits. The no-fault benefits allocable to the var-
ious parties according to the laws of the states connected with the
hypothetical are as follows:
63. See Comment, supra note 13, at 680.
64. See Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969).
65. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2101 (1968).
66. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
67. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).




(i) None under the New York plan, since the accident
took place out-of-state.0 9
(ii) None under the Michigan plan, since she was not
herself insured under the Michigan plan or a residing relative of an
insured and because she, a non-resident, was injured in a car of out-
of-state registration which had not qualified for Michigan insurance
coverage.7 °
(b) Miss Lopez:
None under either the New York or Michigan plans for
at least the same reasons as Miss Tooker.
(c) Miss Silk:
(i) None under the New York plan, for the same reasons
as Miss Tooker.
(ii) Yes, under the Michigan plan, since she was a Michigan
resident and an occupant of a car which had an in-state accident, 71
even if she were not herself insured or a residing relative of an




None under the New York or Michigan plans for at least
the same reasons as Miss Tooker.
(e) The New Jersean:
(i) None under the New York plan, for the same reason
as Miss Tooker.
(ii) Yes, under the New Jersey plan, since he was insured
under a New Jersey policy which extends coverage to the insured in-
jured as a pedestrian by any automobile out-of-state. 3
(iii) Yes, under the Michigan plan,74 which extends cov-
erage to non-resident pedestrians injured in-state. Since no Michigan
insurance policy is applicable to his claim, his recovery would be
from the assigned claims plan.75 In substance, therefore, the New
Jersean would have a choice between the New Jersey and the Michi-
gan plans. If the New Jersean then proceeded to recover in tort
69. N.Y. No-Fault § 672(1).
70. Mich. No-Fault § 3113(c). The opposite result would follow, however, if
Miss Lopez' insurer had filed a Michigan insurance certificate. See note 59 supra.
71. Id. §§ 3113(c), 3114(4).
72. Id. § 3172.
73. N.J. No-Fault § 4.
74. Mich. No-Fault § 3115.
75. Id. § 3172.
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from Miss Lopez, however, he would be required to reimburse the
paying insurer up to the amount of the no-fault benefits received.
This summary of the no-fault benefits actually generated by the
statutes in effect in the home states of the parties involved reveals
an ironic outcome comparable to that which was observed under
the tort exemption: with three no-fault statutes in effect (New York,
Michigan, and New Jersey) from which to allocate reparations, three
of the five injured parties would receive no no-fault benefits. Had
the New York plan been domiciliary-based in its recovery provis-
ions, however, or had it even made benefits for the insured and the
occupants of his car portable extraterritorially (as does the Michigan
plan),76 only the uninsured Ohioan would have been without cov-
erage.
TRANSPOSING Tim Tooker v. Lopez ACCIDENT TO NEW YORK
For a better illustration of the workings of the New York plan,
it would be worthwhile to transpose the accident to New York and
reverse the domicil factor for Miss Tooker, Miss Lopez, and Miss
Silk, so that the former two are Michigan domiciliaries and the latter
a New York domiciliary and the Lopez car is registered and insured
in Michigan. All other facts remain the same.
Tort and Other Liability. If the insurer of the Michigan dom-
iciliary (Miss Lopez), or its parent, subsidiary, or affiliate are auth-
orized to transact business in New York, the New York plan would
forcibly engraft its own no-fault features upon the out-of-state in-
surance when the car is driven in New York.77  Consequently, the
Michigan domiciliary would be shielded by the substantial New York
tort exemption 8 with respect to the claims of all parties other than
76. Id. § 3111. See text accompanying note 95 infra.
77. N.Y. No-Fault § 676. The originally proposed New York plans had gone
further by engrafting a New York no-fault clause on all out-of-state insurance policies
for the period that the insured car was driven in-state, regardless of whether the
insured and the insurer had any other contacts with New York. See Kozyris 367-68,
373. This approach is still used in the Uniform Act. UNIFORM Acr § 9(b). The
author had expressed some doubt as to the constitutionality of this kind of a provision,
see Kozyris 378, and the New York plan subsequently dropped it-principally on the
basis of a memorandum prepared by former Chief Judge Desmond of the New York
Court of Appeals which raised questions as to the validity of the provision under the
interstate commerce and contract clauses of the United States Constitution. See
Ghiardi & Kircher, supra note 23, at 94-95 (1973). See also Note, No-Fault Motor
Vehicle Insurance: A Constitutional Perspective, 46 ST. JOHN's L. Rnv. 104, 121-24
(1971).
78. N.Y, No-Fault § 673(1).
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the Ohioan. 71 If the insurer lacked such contacts with New York,
however, the Michigan domiciliary would not be entitled to the tort
exemption at all.
As to the non-negligent uninsured Ohioan, he would not be sub-
ject to the New York insurance requirement in these circumstances,
he would not be entitled to no-fault benefits, 0 and he would not be
protected by the tort exemption-because he is not a "covered per-
son" under the plan.8' In this respect, the actual New York plan
is significantly less territorial than the original Stewart and Gordon
plans proposed for New York, which would have completely sub-
jected out-of-state motorists driving in New York to the New York
no-fault system."2
The Michigan tort exemption would not be available to the
Michigan domiciliary driving in New York, since it applies only to in-
state accidents,83 and the same is true, inter alia, of the New Jersey ex-
emption.84 The Ohioan, of course, is not entitled to any Michigan
or New Jersey tort exemption for this and other reasons.
No-Fault Benefits. The no-fault benefits payable under the
various plans in the transposed New York accident are as follows:
(a) Miss Tooker (here a Michigan domiciliary)
(i) Yes, under the New York plan, from Miss Lopez'
insurer, assuming that the latter, or an affiliate or subsidiary, is au-
thorized to do business in New York.85
(ii) Yes, under the Michigan plan, as an occupant of a
Michigan insured car.88
(iii) None under the New Jersey plan.17
(b) Miss Lopez (here a Michigan domiciliary)
Same as Miss Tooker.
(c) Miss Silk (here a Michigan domiciliary)
Same as Miss Tooker.
79. Id. §§ 671(10), 673(1). Under these sections, the tort exemption ex-
tends only to recoveries by "covered" persons against other "covered" persons, and the
Ohioan is not a "covered" person.
80. Id. § 672(1)(a).
81. Id. § 673(1).
82. See Kozyris 368 & n.134; 372 & n.153.
83. Mich. No-Fault § 3135(2).
84. N.J. No-Fault § 8.
85. N.Y. No-Fault § 672(1)(a), 676.
86. Mich. No-Fault § 3111. See text accompanying note 95 infra.




(i) None under the New York plan as an occupant of an
uninsured car. 8
(ii) None under the Michigan plan for the same reason. 80
(e) The New Jersean
(i) Yes, under the New York plan, from Miss Lopez' in-
surer,90 assuming again that the policy is made subject to the New
York plan.
(ii) None under the Michigan plan, as a pedestrian injured
out-of-state.91
(iii) Yes, under the New Jersey plan, as a named insured
of a New Jersey policy. 2
OUTCOME ANALYSIS UNDER THE STATE PLANS
Does this allocation of rights and responsibilites in both the
Michigan and the New York accident hypotheticals do "conflicts
justice," and is it consistent with the purpose and policies reflected
in the no-fault concept?
Assuming that no-fault aims at compensation rather than deter-
rence or retribution, 93 and that the "interest" of the state of the acci-
dent as such is limited to insuring that there will be adequate provision
for the expenses incidental to the accident (mostly the medicals) .' 4
certain results reached in the hypotheticals are less than satisfactory.
First, since both Michigan and New York espouse the no-fault
approach, including the tort exemption, what purpose is served by
preserving for Miss Tooker the option to pursue the tort route against
Miss Lopez under the law of either state merely because the insurer
of Miss Lopez did not happen to transact business in such state?
All the contacts of Miss Tooker and Miss Lopez, including domicil,
car registration and insurance, accident location, etc., depending on
the hypothetical, are with a no-fault state. Is it not true that the
reduction of litigation is one of the main aims of no-fault? Is this
not a case of falling between two stools?
88. N.Y. No-Fault § 672(1)(a).
89. Mich. No-Fault §§ 3111, 3113(c).
90. N.Y. No-Fault§ 672(1)(a).
91. Mich. No-Fault § 3111.
92. NJ. No-Fault § 4.
93. See Kozyris 338-39.
94. Id. at 358 n.95, 391.
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Second, in the Michigan accident, why should New York ex-
clude its domiciliaries, Tooker and Lopez, injured in a car registered
and insured under no-fault in New York, from its benefits? In this
type of situation, the actual Tooker case clearly called for the applica-
tion of New York law. Michigan, and most states, follow the cor-
rect rule of making such benefits portable extraterritorially in most
instancesY5
The same questions may be raised with respect to all accidents
(including collisions) occurring out of state, where the cars and persons
involved came from the same state or from states with the same type of
compensation system.
Third, in the New York accident, what is the reason for New
York applying its own no-fault law to measure, for example, the
lost earnings of the two Michigan girls96 rather than referring to the
Michigan measure?9 7  Since the injuries here were slight (as is the
case in most instances where the no-fault plan makes the difference),
one would expect the girls to return to their home base. Why should
their earnings loss be calculated under New York standards? This
approach is particularly objectionable when one considers that it is
the Michigan insurer under a Michigan policy who would be required
to pay these amounts under the New York "transformation" clause.9
The same criticism may be applied to the operation of the Michigan
plan in the Michigan accident hypothetical, where the out-of-state
insurer who has filed a certificate subjects itself to the Michigan
coverage requirements.
Fourth, why, in either case, where insurance coverage is avail-
95. Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-25-1
- 13-25-22 (Supp. 1973); Connecticut No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Law, Conn.
Laws 1972, P.A. No. 273 (May 19, 1972) (CCH AUTO. L. REP.-INs. 1 1947 (July 14,
1972)); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(4)(d)(2) (1973); Hawaii Motor Vehicle Repara-
tions Act, Laws 1973, H.B. No. 637, § 3(b)(1) (CCH AUTo L. REP.-INs. 1952 (June
14, 1973)); Kansas Automobile Reparations Act, Laws 1973, H.B. No. 1129, § 9(a)
(Apr. 11, 1973) (CCH AUTO L. REP.-INs. 1957 (Apr. 19, 1973)); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 90, § 34(a) (1971); Mich. No-Fault § 3111; Nevada Motor Vehicle Insurance Act,
Laws 1973, ch. 530, § 24 (Apr. 24, 1973) (CCH AuTo. L. REP.-INs. 1 1969 (June 1,
1973)); N.J. No-Fault § 4.
Only Utah joins New York in limiting no-fault benefits to in-state accidents.
Utah Automobile Insurance Act, Laws 1973, S.B. No. 112 (CCH AuTo L. REP.-INs.
1985 (Apr. 5, 1973)).
96. Under the New York act, the lost earnings would be up to $1,000 per month
for 3 years, less 20%. N.Y. No-Fault § 671(1)(b), 2(a).
97. In this case, the Michigan measure is virtually identical. Mich. No-Fault
§ 3107(b).
98. N.Y. No-Fault § 676.
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able, should the tort exemption be calculated under the plan of the
accident state rather than that of the state of the most important con-
tacts, such as common domicil, car registration and insurance, trip
origination, etc.?
It is interesting to note that as a result of the territoriality of the
New York plan, in the Michigan accident hypothetical with insur-
ance present, the New York courts will find themselves in the peculiar
position of first applying the Michigan plan to determine no-fault
benefits and tort exemption; and then probably returning to the
New York tort law under the actual Tooker decision to determine
the main claims of the New York domiciliaries.
Fifth, why should the New Jersean be entitled, for example,
to earnings loss benefits pursuant to the Michigan and New York
plans merely because the accident took place within the borders
of those states, especially since he was insured under a New Jersey
policy providing for New Jersey-type benefits?
Under the domiciliary approach proposed in my original article,
all of these problems would disappear."9 Whatever the locus of the
99. It is noteworthy that some of the state no-fault plans take the victim's resi-
dence specifically into account in certain limited instances in making the determination
of whether no-fault benefits are payable or whether there is an insurance obligation.
See, e.g.:
Connecticut: Section 9(a) of the Connecticut No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance
Law distinguishes between residents and non-residents with respect to the insurance
obligation.
Kansas: In the Kansas Automobile Reparations Act, sections 5(f), 6, and 7
exempt non-residents from insurance obligations in certain instances; section 9(a) (4)
states that only residents are entitled to benefits as injured pedestrians in-state, and
section 16 makes the assigned claims plan available only to residents.
Massachusetts: Under MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 90, § 34A (1971), resident pedestri-
ans are entitled to benefits for out-of-state injuries inflicted by an insured car.
Michigan: Mich. No-Fault § 3102 (Special provisions on insurance by non-
residents); § 3113(c) (non-residents occupying out-of-state, uninsured cars not en-
titled to no-fault benefits for in-state injuries).
Nevada: Nevada Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, § 24(2) (non-residents injured
out-of-state in secured commercial vehicle not entitled to benefits).
Utah: Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, § 4 (distinguishing between
residents and non-residents with respect to the insurance obligation).
Professor Pearson, one of the very few to make some comment on the interstate
aspects of no-fault, appears to favor extending benefits to residents and excluding
non-residents whatever the place of the accident, at least if the main thrust of no-fault
is to provide compensation for the victims. But he assumes that the tort exemption is
to be territorial. Pearson, Implementing the No-Fault Concept: An Analysis of Some
Alternatives, 44 Miss. L.J. 74, 79-81 (1973).
A recent case decided in Rhode Island, which follows the government interests
approach to the choice of law, articulates quite clearly the relevance of the residence
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accident, all injured persons would recover under the law of their
home state, and no person causing injuries would carry a reparation
burden heavier than that imposed by his own home state.100
While it is true that the no-fault insurers may thus be required
in some circumstances to pay benefits or damages to an injured non-
domiciliary in excess of the amounts recoverable under the law of
the no-fault state, this is neither unusual nor oppressive, at least
when viewed from the perspective of the insurance industry of the
no-fault state as a whole. It is not unusual because this possibility
is also present in a lex loci system, since the accident may occur in
a state whose laws provide for greater recovery than the law of the
state of insurance. It is not oppressive because the benefits or dam-
ages payable on a domiciliary principle in any given case could well be
below those available under the law of the no-fault state. Accordingly,
the total insurance impact resulting from the use of the domiciliary ap-
proach is likely to be negligible in the long run.'
01
EARLIER INFLUENCES AND CONTINUING CONCERNS
Both before and since the publication of my original article, I
have been unable to discover a comprehensive articulation of the
rationale behind the choice-of-law rules of the various state no-fault
plans, including the Uniform Act.10 2  Nonetheless, several factors
affecting the evolution of the current no-fault statutes at least partially
explain their territorialist orientation. The decisive influence of the
Keeton-O'Connell plan, which limited the tort exemption to in-state
accidents and narrowly defined the classes of persons entitled to
benefits for out-of-state accidents; the appeal which the familiarity
and predictability of the traditional lex loci rule must have had for
the practical-minded tort and insurance experts who were the princi-
pal draftsmen of the no-fault plans; and the general preoccupation
with the substantive aspects of no-fault in the drafting of the plans
connection for automobile accidents. Labree v. Major, 306 A.2d 808, 817-18 (R.I.
1973).
Another interesting example of the increasing reliance on the domiciliary factor is
found in the Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual and Non-Con-
tractual Obligations of the European Economic Community. Even in as traditional a
field as contracts, the Draft Convention in article 4(2) (a), adopts a basic choice prin-
ciple in favor of the law of the habitual residence of the party who is- to perform the
main obligation. See Documents, 21 AM. J. CoMP. L. 587, 588 (1973).
100. Kozyris 390-91. This assumes, of course, that the home-state no-fault plan in-
cludes a residual coverage clause in its qualifying insurance policies.
101. For a fuller explanation of this point, see Kozyris 398-400.
102. See id. at 374-75, 380.
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apparently left little room for in-depth consideration of complex
choice-of-law alternatives. Consequently, a territorialist solution to
the choice-of-law problems may have evolved more by default
than as the result of any conscious process of deliberation.
In explaining this adherence to the lex loci rule, one should
also not underestimate the effect of the lack of a workable, compre-
hensive choice-of-law theory as an alternative. Modem conflicts
theory has not as yet produced a satisfactory new system of the kind
that would appeal to legislators10 3 and it must be conceded that a
new territorialism is regaining favor in certain contexts. 10 4 A tempt-
ing possibility in the drafting of the no-fault plans would have been
to finesse the choice-of-law issue, much along the lines of the Uni-
form Commercial Code,10 5 and make the no-fault benefits or tort
exemption available to persons having an "appropriate relation to
the state," leaving the task of the particular choices to the judiciary.
But such a "solution" would have done little more than add con-
fusion and uncertainty to an already complex subject.
In order to understand the Keeton-O'Connell choice-of-law ap-
proach, and its influence on many of the state plans, it is important
to keep in mind that the Keeton-O'Connell plan involves a cross
between first-party insurance and strict liability principles and that it
is limited in coverage and application. Had it been based solely on
first-party insurance principles coupled with the abolition of tort lia-
bility, the victims recovering solely from their own insurers, the
choice-of-law issue would have virtually disappeared. The extent
and nature of benefits would have depended on the terms of the
policy and the policy would have been issued, as a practical matter
in almost all the cases, in and under the law of the insured's home
state, 0 6 where the car is generally required to be registered. It is
the strict liability aspect of no-fault, the imposition of obligations on
car owners and possibly drivers for the benefit of others, that causes
the main conflicts problem. Since the Keeton-O'Connel plan had
been prepared when the lex loci delicti was prevalent, at least in
practice, and since it was limited in that it did not replace the tort
103. Cf. id. at 347-52.
104. See, e.g., Sedler, The Territorial Imperative: Automobile Accidents and the
Importance of a State Line, 9 DUQUESNE L. REV. 394 (1971); Twerski, Enlightened
Territorialism and Professor Cavers, 9 DUQUJESNE L. REv. 373 (1971); Twerski,
Neumeier v. Kuehner: Where Are the Emperor's Clothes?, 1 HoFsTRA L. RV. 104
(1973); Twerski, To Where Does One Attach the Horses?, 61 Ky. L.J. 393 (1973).
105. UNIoM COMMERMcIL CODE, § 1-105.
106. See Kozyris 337 n.21.
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system entirely, it was natural that it responded to the territorial im-
perative. The plan's only significant deviation from rigid territor-
ialism was its concession of benefits to the insureds and occupants
of the insured car even in out-of-state accidents-following in this
respect the pattern of medical benefits in the traditional liability in-
surance policy.10 7
Keeton and O'Connell were also somewhat concerned with the
constitutional permissibility of full-blown extraterritoriality for the
tort exemption-as well as with the possibility of inconsistent re-
sults that might ensue if other states refused to give effect to that
exemption.' 0 8 Although it may be true that a second interested state
would not be required by the full faith and credit clause to give
effect to an extraterritorial tort exemption granted by the enacting
state, there is no constitutional restriction upon the state's power to
enact a domiciliary-based tort exemption with the expectation that
other states will recognize it in most instances. The validity of the
domiciliary contact as a state interest sufficient to justify choice-of-
law formulations is now well established.' 0 9 And while the objective
of uniformity of result at all potential forums remains desirable, it
is not conclusive." 0 In any event, the dimensions of expected incon-
sistency are reduced in view of the abandonment of the lex loci
delicti by many important jurisdictions."' Furthermore, since the
type of no-fault plan proposed in my earlier article"' would provide
medical benefits for all the domicilaries of the enacting state, where-
ever the accident; would not impose liabilities on the out-of-staters
beyond those of their own state; and would allow injured out-of-
staters to recover under their own law, there would be no major
reason why its extraterritoriality should not be recognized.
As to the in-state applicability of the no-fault system, it has
been pointed out to me that my proposed plan would subject the
domiciliaries of the enacting state as defendants to the inefficiencies
of the tort system if an injured party happens to be an out-of-stater
from a jurisdiction retaining tort liability. While this is true, it is at
least counterbalanced by the expected reduction of litigation among
107. Cf. UNWORM AcT § 2, Comment.
108. Kozyris 375 n.162.
109. See, e.g., Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (Ct. App.
1972) and Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973), discussed in text ar-
companying notes 119-126 infra. See generally Kozyris 403 n.262.
110. See RESTATEmmrN (SEcoND) oF CoNFLicT oF LAWS § 6 (1971).
111. See Kozyris 347 n.63.
112. See note 1 supra.
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no-fault domiciliaries involved in out-of-state accidents. In excep-
tional situations, however, and especially if the reduction of litigation
is viewed as the paramount consideration, it may be wise to bend the
domiciliary principle by limiting the out-of-stater's recovery for in-
state accidents to the no-fault benefits of the no-fault state. Such an
adjustment would seem appropriate in a jurisdiction such as the Dis-
trict of Columbia, where a substantial percentage of cars and per-
sons are from another jurisdiction.
Some doubt has also been expressed on the use of domicil or
residence as the connecting factor at a time when our population
has become more mobile and the home connection more tenuous-
and when discrimination based on residence has come under con-
stitutional attack on equal protection and privileges-and-immunities
grounds. In the treatment of no-fault as a state problem, however,
the assumption is implicit that regional differences justify different
approaches. The issue, then, is not whether we should have uni-
formity or diversity; the issue is how the diverse plans may be so
designed as to mesh together on the interstate plane. In this con-
text, it would seem that the law of the place where one lives and
where he normally registers, garages, and insures his car is prefer-
able to the law of the place where the accident happens.113
SOME CONSTITUTIONAL CONSmERATIONS
As indicated earlier, the power of the states to enact and en-
force no-fault provisions which tie compensation and tort exemption
benefits to a person's domicil does not appear vulnerable to success-
ful attack on constitutional grounds. To be sure, the Supreme Court
has recently struck down state "durational" residence re-
quirements in certain contexts. Such requirements have succumbed
to attack on the basis of equal protection, due process, and/or the
right to travel, when applied as a precondition to welfare benefits
(Shapiro v. Thompson),114 voting rights (Dunn v. Blumstein) ,Xx5 and
,standard tuition charges (Vlandis v. Kline).6 A study of the
opinions in these 'cases, however, is quite reassuring for the continued
.Viability of the domiciliary connecting factor in choice-of-law. First,
in al of these cases, there was discrimination among various categories
of residents, not between residents and non-residents. As a matter
113. See Kozyris 354-55.
114. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
115. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
116. 41 U.S.L.W. 4796 (U.S. June 11, 1973).
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of fact, in Vlandis, the right of a state to charge higher tuition to
non-residents was not challenged since this issue had already been
decided affirmatively in Starns v. Malkerson.117  Second, these cases
involved allegedly "invidious" discrimination, the denial of fights or
benefits to certain groups on a basis which was either irrational or
not grounded on a compelling state interest.
The decision to make the choice of law in the no-fault context
on the basis of domicil or residence is not "invidiously" discrimi-
natory, since it reflects a neutral principle of allocation which may
be favorable or unfavorable to the non-domiciliary or non-resident
depending on the content of the applicable law. It extends the ob-
ligations, as well as the benefits, of the state no-fault plan to the
domiciliary class. Moreover, the state interest in its residents or
domiciliaries is well recognized,' 18 so that employing this connecting
factor is not arbitrary or irrational.
Two recent and leading New York cases illustrate well the vi-
ability, as well as the constitutional validity, of the domicilary con-
tact as a basis for the choice of law. In both Neumeier v. Kueh-
ner1  and Rosenthal v. Warren, 20 the domicil of the plaintiff was
the crucial factor in determining whether New York substantive law
would be applied. In both cases, New York law would have favored
the plaintiff. In Kuehner, the estate of an Ontario domiciliary killed
in an Ontario automobile accident involving a New York car insured
in New York was denied recovery because of the Ontario guest stat-
ute-even though it was perfectly clear that recovery would have
been allowed under Tooker v. Lopez' 21 had the decedent been a New
York domiciliary. Judge Fuld waived away a charge of discrimina-
tion in the following words:
To distinguish Tooker on such a basis is not improperly discriminatory.
It is quite true that, in applying the Ontario guest statute to the Ontario-
domiciled passenger we, in a sense, extend a right less generous than
New York extends to a New York passenger in a New York vehicle
with New York insurance. That, though, is not a consequence of
117. 401 U.S. 985 (1971), rev'g mem., 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970).
118. A federal district court in Illinois put it thusly: "The predominant interests to
be served on the issue of damages are those of the states containing the people or
estates which will receive the recoverable damages, if any, for their injuries or their
decedent's death." Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1170, 1173
(N.D. Ill. 1969).
119. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
120. 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973).
121. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969). See text accom-
panying note 57 supra.
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invidious discrimination; it is, rather, the result of the existence of dis-
parate rules of law in jurisdictions that have important connection with
the litigants and the litigated issue.12 2
In Rosenthal, the Second Circuit applied New York substantive
law in favor of a New York domiciliary who died in Massachusetts
in the hands of a Massachusetts surgeon under circumstances in which
it was indisputable that Massachusetts substantive law would have
been applicable had the decedent been a Massachusetts domiciliary.
The court accepted the New York policy of refusing to apply sister
state damage ceilings to limit recoveries by New York domiciliaries
involved in out-of-state accidents 23 -a policy which survived a con-
stitutional due process and full faith and credit attack in Pearson v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc.,124 as a "proper exercise of [the state's]
power to develop conflict of laws doctrine.' 25  The Rosenthal court
also noted with approval the New York tendency to rely on the
domiciliary contact in choosing the law controlling the extent of
liability even in cases involving non-citizens.' 20
Finally, in light of the Supreme Court's consistent reluctance
to interfere with state choice-of-law rules under the full faith and
credit or due process clauses in the past, 27 there is little reason to
expect the Court to embark on a new venture of strict scrutiny of
such rules on equal protection or privileges and immunities grounds. 28
122. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 125, 286 N.E.2d 454, 456, 335 N.Y.S
2d 64, 68 (1972). Professor Sedler, applying the Currie constitutional analysis (see
B. CUmus, SELECTED ESSAYS ON TIM CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) ), believes that Neu-
neier violates the equal protection clause. Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the Un-
provided For Case: Reflections on Neumeler v. Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 125,
148 (1973). But Currie's suggested approach in this particular area was not only
ambiguous but tentative, and he entertained some doubts as to its validity. Culun,
supra, at 571-72. In any event, even if the Neumeler distinction were to be found
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, an extremely unlikely supposition, a
no-fault system based on insurance, allocating not only benefits but also responsi-
bilities under the domiciliary laws of the parties involved, would be much less likely
to suffer the same fate.
123. That policy was originally adopted in the leading case of Kilberg v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
124. 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
125. Id. at 556.
126. In this respect, the court in Rosenthal cited Thomas v. United Airlines, Inc.,
24 N.Y.2d 714, 249 N.E.2d 755, 301 N.Y.S.2d 973, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 991 (1969)
and Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796,
266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965).
127. The last time that the Supreme Court invalidated a choice-of-law on consti-
tutional grounds was in Order of Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
See also Kozyris, 403 n.262.
128. Even Professor Sedler concedes that: "[lilt is questionable whether the Su-
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Thus, a domicil-based no-fault system, neutrally administered in cir-
cumstances where the out-of-stater may fare better under his own
law, and closely tied to insurance, 1 9 does not appear to involve any
recognizable constitutional risk.
CONCLUSION
With the no-fault concept threatening substantially to replace the
tort system for automobile accidents, one would have expected the
conflicts scholars to be in the front line of the debate--especially
since auto accidents have generated a large share of the more cele-
brated conflicts cases, as well as many of the new conflicts theories
and methodologies. Instead, there is complete silence. The choice-
of-law experts continue to engage in transcendental meditation over
guest-statutes, 130 a rather limited and anachronistic exception to negli-
gence liability, 3 ' while the state no-fault legislators are bulldozing
away progressive conflicts innovations with specific territorially-orient-
ed rules. The traditional penchant of conflicts experts to dissect judi-
cial opinions for vindication of their orthodoxies or heterodoxies rath-
er than to propose specific legislative solutions risking criticism is well-
known. But is this the only explanation? I do not know. It may
be that the possibility of a national or a uniform plan, with the con-
sequent reduction of the conflicts problem, has led to a wait-and-see
attitude until the dust settles; or possibly the novelty of the combina-
preme Court will be willing to find limitations on choice of law inherent in the privi-
leges and immunities and equal protection clauses." Sedler, supra note 122, at 148.
According to B. CRAMPTON & D. CupRIE, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS-CASES--CoM-
MENTS-QUESTIONS (1968):
Neither Privileges and Immunities nor Equal Protection is firmly established
as a limitation upon choice of law; the Currie and Schreter article on the
former clause may have been the first of its kind, and the article on equal
protection relies upon no Supreme Court cases dealing specifically with choice
of law. Indeed these two articles are probably the least understood of the
Currie collection. . . . Id. at 428.
On the ambiguity and contradiction of the Currie positions in this area, see id. at
426-27.
129. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 n.10 (1969), the welfare benefits
case discussed in text accompanying note 114 supra, where the Court stated that
"We are not dealing here with state insurance programs which may legitimately tie
the amount of benefits to the individual's contributions."
130. See, e.g., learned symposia on Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854
k1970) in 9 DUQUESNE L. Rav. 347-465 (1971); Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827
(Ky. 1972) in 61 Ky. LJ. 368-428 (1973); and Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d
121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972) in 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 93-182 (1973).
131. The California guest statute has been declared unconstitutional for violation of
the equal protection clause. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 388 (1973).
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dion of tort and insurance features makes the problem especially difficult
to handle and deters people from embarking on the enterprise. What-
ever the cause, no-fault is surging ahead without the benefit of a full
conflicts discussion, and, once the rules crystallize, it will be rather
difficult to do much more than attempt to interpret them, probing
for, and speculating about, a legislative intention which may never
have existed.
